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de l'enfance. Son charisme était peut-être trop 
dur, ou trop vivant, pour se durcir en institution. 
Ce livre nous apporte à cet égard un témoignage 
irremplaçable pour mieux comprendre l'homme 
et ses aspirations les plus profondes, le chrétien 
convaincu qui cherche à dialoguer avec l'Inde, 
enfin le théologien spirituel qui appuie tous ses 
discours sur" l'Esprit, le Fond de Dieu (cf. 1 
Cor 2,10), qui est aussi le fond même de l'âme en 
état de grâce, le mystère le plus intime de chaque 
élu ... » (p. 77). 
André COUTURE 
KOPACZYNSKI, Germain, Linguistic Ramifications 
of the Essence-Existence Debate, Washington, 
D.C., 1979: University Press of America. 
Pp. xii + 199. Bibliography. Index of names. 
$9.25. 
This book proposes that the centuries-long debate 
about the rcal distinction between essence and 
existence in beings other than God derives in 
important part from problems of language ine-
luctably Inherent in the metaphysical enterprise. 
This is taken, not as reason to abandon meta-
physics, but as ai ding one to understand the 
nature of the enterprise itself. 
With this proposai 1 am deeply sympathetic,' 
and so 1 wou Id like to report that this book is 
worth buying and reading. Howevcr 1 cannot do 
so. Too long is taken to say too little, and even 
what is said is not adequately discussed. 
For example, in the final chapter we are 
introduced to a picture of the history of philo-
sophy in which "the great Christian thinkers have 
been in fundamental agreement on the necessity 
and validity of the basic metaphysical principles. 
This accord runs through such questions as the 
existence and nature of God, the knowledge and 
the freedom of man, the basic structure and 
demands of the moral law, and the unit y, 
goodness and ultimate harmony of reality." (l27) 
Metaphysical differences and debates go on at a 
"secondary lever' (129), that of "system-building" 
(127, 129). The are a agreement is "the deeper 
metaphysics" (128). The problem of metaphysical 
language is seen in the area of "systematic meta-
physical language" (BI). Nevertheless, while there 
is agreement "on the basic metaphysical verities" 
(140), disagreement and "'stretching' of lan-
guage" in the systematic endeavours, we should 
not take this to mean that the points of agreement 
are or can be adequately conceplualized (185, 
n. 62). Such a distinction requires much more 
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exploration and explanation than it is given. The 
reader can be forgiven if he wonders eilher how 
"secondary" the secondary level is, or, if it be 
admitted that it is secondary, whether the author 
has not reneged on his commitment to take the 
language problem more seriously than those he 
criticizes. 2 One thinks. for example, of Charles 
De Koninck's conception of what constitutes a 
"system". He insists on the uni/y of natural 
conceptions (first or corn mon conceptions) and 
proper (secondary, less naturally given) concep-
tions in the growth of healthy philosophy. System 
cornes about precisely inasmuch as one begins to 
Jubs/i/ute proper conceptions for common ones. ' 
My only point here is that Kopaczynski makes no 
reference to such distinctions, and his presen-
tation of philosophy with its two levels gives us 
little idea of how the deep level might nourish the 
further elaborations. We are left with a view of 
philosophers as ail "system-builders". The end-
result of ail our philosophizing will always be 
"human constructions" (138), "metaphysical 
system-building in the thinkers' mind and not 
with a one-to-one necessary correspondence with 
the actual being of existing Teality" (129). Does 
this last description mean that when 1 speak of a 
thing's "essence" as other than its "esse", the 
words "essence" and "esse" do not Tefer to 
distinct items on the side of things? 
Again, the book has as a primary theme that 
metaphysicians have much to learn from the 
philosophers of the language analysis and posi-
tivist schools of the present century. Paraphrasing 
Fr. Copleston, Kopaczynski says : " ... language is 
designed primarily for dealing with empirical 
reali/y: here is language's center of the Iinguistic 
platform." (137) Copleston had said: " ... lan-
guage is after ail primarily developed to express 
our immedia/e experience of surrounding things ... " 
(Emphasis mine in both quotations) Il seems ta 
me that Kopaczynski's expression "stretches" 
Cop1eston's, and stretches it in the direction of 
embracing the empiricist's starting-point. 1 found 
myself wondering how to classify a dog. 1 am sure 
it should be put among Copleston's "surrounding 
things", but 1 have my doubts whether it would 
pass muster as an "empirical reality". Il might 
very weil be found under the "trans-empirical" 
banner, a "metaphysical reaIity". 1 would Iike to 
have seen more philosophical discussion, less a 
scattering of references to this and that author. 
Why not say that language is basically ontological 
in character. that our commonest words and our 
ordinary language have a fundamentally onto-
logical orientation, that the vocabulary of being 
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is "at the center of the linguistic platform"? Once 
more, 1 would have welcomed reference 10 the 
reflections on language of Charles De Koninck. 
His distinction between word or na me and symbol 
raises questions about many seeming "Iessons" 
one might learn from philosophers of the empi-
ricist tradition. 4 
A couple of particular notes on the earlier 
part of the book: 
(1) Kopaczynski spends time sbowing that St. 
Thomas Aquinas says a real distinction can exist 
only between two res (48-49): he takes the texts 
concerned as usable in argument against saying 
that St. Thomas regarded the distinction between 
essence and esse as real; this is because "Thomas ... 
never speaks of esse as ares ... " (43) This is not 
true. Thank goodness, St. Thomas does on at 
least one occasion speak of esse as ares. Indeed 
he uses it as something obvious, in order to expia in 
a way of speaking about veritas. He tosses il off, as 
though to say: "Anyone should know what I 
mean when I speak that way!" Cf. De veritate 
q. 1, a. 4, ad4. "Res" has to be used with the same 
sort of variability in meaning seen in such words 
as "ens" and "unum". (2) There is a rather glaring 
error in the use of a Latin text of St. Thomas at 
p. 57. Kopaczynski says he is following "Prof. 
Carlo" in citing the text, but he gives no reference 
to any work of William Carlo at this point. He 
cites ln 1 Sent., d. 33, q. l, a. l, ad 1 (cf. ed. 
Mandonnet, p. 766). He reads the text as one 
wherein St. Thomas "apparently holds esse to be 
accidentai". (57) ln fact, what is being called an 
"accidens" in the text is the relation, not the esse 
of the relation. The relation has esse (meaning the 
act of the essence) from those things which cause 
it in the subject, and according to this esse the 
relation is not referred or related to another 
thing; rather, the relation is referred or related to 
the very subject in which it is found, just like any 
other accident (in one of the other categories). 
1 cannot help reflecting that it is sad to find 
this idea that philosophers in the Aristotelian or 
Scholastic or generally Western philosophical 
tradition require teaching from the most recent 
representatives of the Empiricist school, as to the 
importance of language in metaphysical thought. 
When one thinks of how pro minent the problèms 
of language have been in that tradition! Let us 
mention Plato's Seventh Letter,' Aristotle's Me-
taphysics, book delta. Think of the metaphysico-
linguistic aspects of the Christological and Trini-
tarian controversies. Remember Augustine's De 
trinitate, De doctrina christiana. De magistro. 
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Think only of St. Thomas' Summa the%giae 
I, q. J3 and ils parallels ! Anyone who has worked 
seriously in the do main of metaphysical discus-
sion can hardly ever have doubted the impor-
tance of language. lndeed, the reality of meta-
physics should direct our attention to the profun-
dit y of language, its resourcefulness not merely as 
"in vocative" of things but as representing things. 
No conception of language can abstract from the 
finesse of the speaker of words. 1 would most 
willingly admit that speaking about God presents 
very special, indeed unique problems. However, 
this truth tells us something about the nature of 
language: not merely its poverty, but also its 
surprising resourcefulness. If we say that man is 
an animal capable of speech or language, let us 
not suppose offhandedly that language is a reality 
ail that available for our inspection: we have not 
seen what a resourceful creature is the "speaker 
of words" until we have heard him speak about 
God without altogether failing (and here 1 mean 
that such language is not merely "invocative", 
but is representative: as St. Thomas teaches, 
when we cali God "good" or "wise", we represent 
Him, though imperfectly [Summa the%giae I, 
q. 13, a. 2; ed. Ottawa, 77bI4-41 D. 
Notes 
1. Cf. my "St. Thomas, Capreolus, and Enti-
tative Composition", Divus Thomas 80 (1977) 
355-375; also "St. Thomas and the Divine 
Names", Science et Esprit 32 (1980) 19-33. 
2. His example of someone to be criticized is 
Jacques Maritain: cf. p. 182, n. 24. However, 
Kopaczynski's note, refering to A Preface to 
Metaphysics, should read "pp. 15-16" instead 
of "pp. 5-6". 
3. Cf. Charles De Koninck, "Three Sources of 
Philosophy", Proceedings of the American Ca-
tholic Philosophica/ Association 1964, p. 17. 
4. Cf. e.g. The Hol/ol<' Uni verse, London, 1960: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 9-16, 59-64 (and 
the whole book). On the lesson of logical 
positivism, Kopaczynski could also have re-
ferred with profit to Jacques Maritain, The 
Range of Reason, New York, 1952: Scribners, 
pp. 5-10. 
5. Plato's Seventh Letter provides the theme for 
the la st chapter of Etienne Gilson's Linguis-
tique et philosophie, Paris, 1969: Vrin, a work 
to which no reference is made by Kopac-
zynski, though he makes much use of earlier 
writings of Gilson. 
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